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1The military’s overthrow of President Muhammad Morsi, longtime member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in July 2013 marked the latest chapter in an ongoing struggle between Egypt’s most organized, armed state bureaucracy and 
its most organized non-state actor. Historic trajectories of conflict and cooperation 
between these two groups have been driven by unbalanced civil-military relations; the 
political supremacy of the military over all other institutions has plagued the country’s 
politics since the 1952 coup. 
Relations between Islamists and the military are a key factor in determining prospects 
for democratization in Egypt. Levels of popular support for the military and the MB 
are much greater than that for any of the other political forces in the country. On 
the one hand, this may be problematic for the future of democracy in Egypt. On the 
other, Egypt is less likely to make political or economic progress without a thorough 
reconfiguration of its Islamist-military relations. 
Egyptian political transitions in 1952-1954 as well as 2011-2013—the former begun by 
a coup, the latter effectively ended by one—have generally entailed initial coordination 
between Islamists and dominant military factions at the outset, followed by a violent 
falling-out. This paper focuses on Islamist-military relations and performs a comparative 
analysis of their interactions during those two critical transition periods. It addresses two 
research questions:
1. How does the military reach decisions when dealing with the MB during   
 transition periods?
2. How does the MB reach decisions regarding the military establishment during  
 transition periods?
The paper has five sections and follows a particular logic of analysis. The first section 
addresses patterns of the political contexts in which military coups have been staged 
against democratically elected leaders or democratization processes. It reflects on how 
coups are risky endeavors, making the decision to stage them complicated. The second 
section is an overview of the legacies and patterns of conflict and cooperation between 
the leaderships of Egypt’s military and Egypt’s MB. This section provides the necessary 
empirical background for the analysis. The paper then analyzes the decision-making 
processes within the military establishment by considering four approaches: a rational 
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actor approach, an organizational one, a factional one, and a psychological one. The 
fourth section focuses on the MB’s decision-making process in a similar fashion.
The aforementioned decision-making approaches help illuminate the drivers of this 
bloody confrontation between the two groups. The military’s leadership, the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), aimed to protect the independence of its 
economic activities and complexes, its veto power over Egyptian high politics, and its 
legal immunity, while avoiding any attempt at comprehensive security sector reform 
during the 2011-2013 transition period. It benefited significantly from the transition 
process. Hence, a rational-actor approach of perceiving Morsi’s government as a threat 
to their interests does not provide a full explanation. 
The standard operating procedures (SOPs) of armed institutions before the revolution 
suggest clear continuity in how they are trained to address political instability, principally 
relying on intimidation and brute repression to restore order. At the same time, popular 
political polarization against the MB may have encouraged hardline “eradicator” factions 
within the armed institutions. The overall psychology of the military, given its superiority 
complex towards the civilian population in general and the MB in particular, also eased 
the decision to carry out a coup and embark on a violent crackdown in the aftermath.
For the MB, an initially rational policy of gradualist, hands-off interaction with the 
military eventually worked against the group, as major factions within the armed and 
security forces resisted and ignored presidential directives. Factionalism mattered. A 
centralized “Iron Organization” faction pushed the MB to field a presidential candidate 
in 2012, while MB revolutionary youth factions spurred the group to embark on a path 
of resistance in the aftermath of the coup in 2013. Additionally, historic memories of 
the MB’s acquiescence to Nasser’s growing repression back in the 1950s likely haunted 
the MB’s 2013 leadership, imbuing them with a defiant psychology of “never again” in 
the face of the military coup.
Improved civil-military relations hold the key to Egypt’s political future. Egypt has little 
hope of social stability, and thereby economic recovery, if the relationship between the 
highly organized, once widely popular MB and the politicized military cannot play out 
via democratic political competition. The military stands to gain directly from such a 
process, as the armies of democracies are far more effective in combat and less likely to 
clash with civilian populations.
Restructuring relations will not be easy. At a minimum, Egyptian institutions and foreign 
training programs should begin to promote security studies to educate politicians and 
officers alike on the nature of civil-military relations. At the same time, U.S. military aid to 
Egypt should not be fully resumed until the current military-dominated regime takes real 
steps toward supporting a democratic transition. Furthermore, the Egyptian parliament, 
whenever it is reconvened, should exercise greater oversight as to how this aid reaches 
military budgets. 
3With regards to the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization should draw on the legacies 
of post-coup experiences in South America and Southern Europe to endure repression 
while pressuring the regime for democratization and reform. This will require working 
to build a sustained, solid, and cross-ideological civilian front—something currently 
lacking from the Egyptian political scene. To participate in such a front, the MB will 
have to confront its own internal rivalries and the conspiratorial outlook bred by the 
harsh campaign against it. 
The economic, social and humanitarian damage engendered by the 2013 military coup 
is considerable, with ongoing post-coup repression sure to prove even more harmful. 
The heavy costs of the status quo will likely force all sides to reconsider their positions, 
leading to a process of “forced maturation.”
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“States [like ours] ranged across to Syria and down to Iraq. Neither Iraq 
exists nor will Syria keep on existing. You know why? Because when the 
army intervened [and] took the side of a party… The favored party began to 
use force against the other parties, regardless of who they are, and regardless 
of how successful they were or how strong their reasoning. I, as an army, 
do not care. I am saying this today because… we currently have a situation 
in Egypt. Don’t you dare think that patriotism means for us to stand with 
one party against another,” said General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi to a group of 
military officers.1 
A few weeks after delivering this clear warning against the military intervening in politics, the general led Egypt’s 2013 military coup. “As for the revolution, the Muslim Brothers neither think about it, nor depend on it. They neither believe 
in its usefulness nor its results,” said Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Society of 
the Muslim Brothers, or Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in a speech at the organization’s 
fifth general conference in February 1939.2 He argued that revolutions have usually 
led to negative consequences and are therefore not a viable method for reformist 
“Islamic” change, a point he stressed multiple times.3 More than seventy years later, the 
MB strongly supported a “revolution” leading to elections that brought them into the 
presidential palace.
This contradiction between the rhetoric and the behavior of both the military and 
the MB merits thorough analysis. The most organized state bureaucracy and the most 
organized non-state actor have occasionally cooperated and almost constantly clashed, 
affecting the political past, present, and potentially the future of Egypt. At the core 
of these conflict-and-cooperation trajectories is the issue of unbalanced civil-military 
relations. The supremacy of armed institutions over elected and judicial civilian 
institutions has plagued Egyptian politics since the country’s 1952 military coup—a 
coup in which junior military officers and the MB were partners and co-plotters. Like in 
other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, the relations between Islamists and the 
military have been a core determinant of the prospects for democratization in Egypt.4 
This paper focuses on that subject and performs a comparative analysis of military-MB 
interactions during two of Egypt’s critical transition periods: 1952-1954 and 2011-
2013. The paper addresses two research questions: how does the military reach decisions 
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establishment? This is done using a comparative-historical, qualitative approach. While 
aiming to analyze Islamist-military relations, the paper will not attempt a thorough 
review of the history of these two transition periods.  
This paper has five sections and follows a particular logic of analysis. The first section 
addresses patterns in the political contexts in which military coups have been staged 
against democratically elected leaders or democratization processes. It reflects how 
coups are risky and have a high likelihood of negatively affecting states as a whole. This 
complicates the decision to stage them, especially in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. The 
second section is an overview of the legacies and the patterns of conflict and cooperation 
between the leaderships of Egypt’s military and Egypt’s MB. This section provides the 
necessary empirical background for the analysis. The paper then focuses on the decision-
making processes within the military establishment. It analyzes how the military has 
made its most critical decisions by considering four models: a rational actor model, 
an organizational model, a factionalism model, and a psychological model. The fourth 
section focuses on the MB’s decision-making process in a similar fashion. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the way forward. 
This paper does not focus on regional and foreign patronage and its impact on decision-
making. This is mainly due to space limitations, but also in an attempt to isolate the 
domestic environment and its factors. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that the 
military is by far the largest and the most consistent recipient of foreign funding, 
equipping, and training in Egypt, outpacing any and all other institutions and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) put together. Between 1948 and 2014, the United 
States, by itself, has provided Egypt’s military with $74.65 billion in aid, with more 
than half of that coming since 1979.5 No other state institution, NGO, or any other 
entity in Egypt receives that level of funding. It should also be noted that the MB has 
a transnational component. Whereas the influence of its international organization on 
the local “chapters” is limited (and in some cases negligible), the transnational links of 
the MB matter in terms of logistical and moral support as well as for networking and 
recruitment dynamics.
This paper argues that the levels of popular support for the military and the MB are 
much greater than for any other political force in the country. While this reality may 
be problematic for the future of democracy in Egypt, the country is less likely to make 
political or economic progress without a thorough reconfiguration of its Islamist-
military relations. 
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The debate in Egypt between supporters of President Muhammad Morsi and anti-coup activists, on one hand, and the supporters of General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and the military takeover, on the other, can be represented by the following 
question: Was the July 3, 2013 event in which Morsi was deposed and the military 
assumed power a coup or a revolution? For scholars, the answer is clear—the event was a 
coup. For politicians and activists, however, the core of the issue is not about scholastic 
definitions, but legitimacy. Casting the ouster of an elected president, the dissolution 
of an elected parliament, the suspension of a constitution, and the repression of the 
political opposition as a revolution legitimates anti-democratic actions and the political 
comeback of the military. Casting it as a coup removes that legitimacy—hence, the 
problem.
Definitions and Features of Coups
There are indeed multiple definitions of coups in political science literature.6 One that 
captures and summarizes most of them defines a coup as “an illegal and overt attempt 
by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.”7 
This is regardless of the amount of popular support that exists for the coup and its 
plotters.
Coups are usually classified based on four dimensions: the perpetrators, their motives, 
their tactics, and their targets. While Finer limits coup perpetrators to the armed forces, 
Luttwak, Ferguson, Janowitz, Taylor and Jodice, O’Kane, Marshall, and other scholars 
include civilian parties or groups and non-military elites as coup co-perpetrators.8 These 
latter scholars agree that coups may be undertaken by any elite in collaboration with the 
military and security services. In terms of tactics, scholars agree that the illegal use or 
threat of force is the principal feature of military coups, though the levels of violence and 
bloodshed vary greatly. Moreover, coups consistently correlate with gross human rights 
violations and are linked to future civil war.9 Military coups even have numerous common 
features with terrorism, as both are forms of political violence that include the illegitimate 
use of force against civilians or non-combatants to achieve a political objective, influence a 
government, or intimidate the public.10 When it comes to targets, coups are classified based 
on the regime type they attempt to depose, whether a military dictatorship, constitutional 
monarchy, democratically elected civilian government, or something else.
On Coups
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Coups that target democratically elected governments correlate with high levels of 
bloodshed and repression.11 The freely elected figure or institution that is deposed 
usually has significant support among segments of the society, subsets of which choose 
resistance over submitting to the coup’s perpetrators.12 
To assert supremacy and control, the perpetrators turn 
to massive repression. Such cases are prevalent over the 
past century from Spain in 1936 to Egypt in 2013.13
In general, coups have a negative impact on democ-
ratization processes and correlate with the inhibition 
of democratic consolidation.14 Some patterns have 
emerged based on what type of regime the coup plot-
ters target. If the target of the coup is an elected institution or electoral process, the 
likelihood of a wave of repression is high while the probability of democratic transi-
tion is low.15 Globally, out of the 217 coups staged between 1945 and 2008, only 14 
(6.4 percent) have led to initiating a democratization process.16 If the coup deposes an 
authoritarian regime, however, there is a significant chance of the perpetrators limiting 
their domains of power and prerogatives and initiating a democratic process. This was 
the case in Portugal in 1974, for example. Of the 88 successful coups that occurred in 
Africa between 1945 and 2008, only 4 (4.5 percent) led to initiating a democratization 
process, but all 4 of those coups were staged against military regimes that had themselves 
taken power by coups.17
When coups do negatively impact democratization, the effect usually does not last. 
Powell and Thyne have shown that within several years of both successful and failed 
coups, countries’ mean “Polity scores” recover to pre-coup levels, if not improving.18 
This rise in Polity score is usually preceded by a period of persistent civil resistance, 
social polarization, economic deterioration, or political unrest that may ultimately lead 
to compromise and a political opening.19
“Brumairean Moments”
There were 457 coup attempts globally between 1950 and 2010, 227 (49.7 percent) 
of which succeeded in removing a government.20 Many of these coups had significant 
support from specific segments of the society. When the coups targeted democratically 
elected leaders or institutions, those supportive segments usually included most of the 
losers in the electoral process, influential members of the upper and upper-middle social 
classes who negatively perceived the new ruling elite, and the supporters and beneficiaries 
of military rule. This pattern was evident in General Franco’s 1936 coup against the 
Popular Front in Spain, General Zahedi’s 1953 coup against Muhammad Mossadegh’s 
“Coups that target democratically elected 
governments correlate 
with high levels 
of bloodshed and 
repression.
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government in Iran, General Branco’s 1964 coup against President Goulart in Brazil, 
General Pattakos and Colonel Papadopoulos’ 1967 coup in Greece, General Pinochet’s 
1973 coup in Chile, General Videla’s 1976 coup in Argentina, General Evren’s 1980 
coup in Turkey, General Bashir’s 1989 coup in Sudan, and others.
In most of the aforementioned cases, narrowly elected governments were ousted by 
military juntas that enjoyed the support of some segments of the political spectrum and 
society. Such periods constitute what Alfred Stepan calls “Brumairean moments.”21 He is 
referring to Karl Marx’s seminal 1852 essay entitled “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte.” Marx was explaining why influential segments of the urban upper-middle 
class in France supported a military dictatorship under Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, as 
well as the suppression of their lower class socio-political rivals.22 Indeed, the types of 
societal segments that have supported coups as brutal as Franco’s, Pinochet’s, Videla’s, 
and Evren’s raise eyebrows as they include political parties, civil society groups, and 
even religious institutions and figures such as Catholic priests in the cases of Chile 
and Argentina.23 In explaining the support for Branco’s coup, Stepan concludes, “Fear 
created a social base and the Brumairean moment. But as the Sao Paulo entrepreneurs 
learned in the late 1970s, the receding of bourgeois fear does not mean that power once 
yielded to the military will be given back without a struggle.”24 
Egypt has had its own Brumairean moments. In 1952, an army faction staged a coup 
not only against the monarchy, but also against an elected parliament. Once King 
Farouk I departed, a minority within the junta wanted to recall the parliament and 
resume constitutional democratic politics.25 The majority, however, wanted a military 
dictatorship. Due to the significant firepower held by 
the minority, the competing factions compromised, 
agreeing to refer the matter to the judiciary. 
On July 31, 1952, a highly politicized State Council 
ruled in a nine-to-one decision that the parliament 
should not be recalled. Abdel-Razzaq al-Sanhouri, the 
head of the Council, and Suleiman Hafiz, the deputy 
of the Council, opposed the Wafd party, which was the most popular at the time, and 
aimed to block it from controlling the parliament.26 At a later stage, the Council also 
ruled that it was constitutionally legitimate for an army officer to preside over a civilian 
government.27 Nine unelected, politicized judges voted to bring down their elected 
political rivals, and with them Egypt’s fledgling democracy. Significant segments of the 
public supported the decision, but seemingly not a majority. On December 29, 1952, 
some of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s army colleagues and leading members of the MB asked 
him to hold elections.28 He replied, “If I held elections today, al-Nahas [the leader of 
al-Wafd party] would win. What have we achieved then?”29
“When coups negatively impact 
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last.
9The aforementioned meeting with Nasser was attended by members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the MB. It reflects a pattern of relationships in Egyptian political history. The military, represented by its 
controlling faction, and Islamists, represented by the MB’s leadership, coordinated at 
the beginning of a transition process. Then the visions and the interests of the two 
sides would diverge. At this point, given the structural weakness of non-violent conflict 
resolution mechanisms (whether institutional, legal, cultural or political) and the 
superior capacity of the military to utilize violence, the Islamists have historically ended 
up losing out. Ultimately, after initially cordial interactions, the military usually ends up 
repressing the Islamists, and in extreme cases perpetrating massacres, like in Tora Prison 
in June 1957 and at Rab‘a Square in August 2013.30 The repression engenders waves of 
resistance that take various forms, from classic civil resistance to violent armed tactics. 
Depending on the timeframe, these waves expand or shrink in their scope, geographical 
scale, intensity, and duration.31
The First Round: 1952-1954
In the past hundred years, Egypt witnessed three major transitional periods that significantly 
affected its contemporary politics. The first occurred between 1919 and 1923, when 
Egypt reclaimed partial independence from Great Britain and established a constitutional 
monarchy through the promulgation of the 1923 constitution. This transitional period 
yielded a relatively liberal constitution, a system of institutionalized party politics, and a 
parliament, though its powers were greatly inferior to those held by the ruling monarch 
and the British consul-general. However, social injustices, corruption, and the co-optation 
of the political elite by the palace and the former colonial power, as well as the humiliating 
1948 defeat against Israel, all contributed to the popularity of the Free Officers’ military 
coup, staged on July 23, 1952. This was the first major coordination between army officers 
and the MB to oust a ruling regime. 
This coup sparked another transitional period, which lasted until 1954. By then, the victorious 
faction within the army had put an end to Egypt’s limited democratic experience. That transition 
yielded a military-dominated system, a state-controlled economy, and a ban on political parties. 
From this point onward, the military establishment became the most powerful political actor in 
Egypt, wiping out or co-opting every rival and creating a new set of political rules. 
I slamist-Military Relations 
in Egypt:  An Overview
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The MB coordinated with the army officers in various ways and forms before and after 
the 1952 coup. Several MB members were also army and police officers. The graduations 
of MB students from the military academy were publicly celebrated in MB headquarters 
as early as 1940. When preparations for the 1952 coup started in late 1949, MB officers 
were an integral part of it. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mun‘im Abdul 
Ra’uf, a leading figure in the MB, was one of the seven officers who co-founded the first 
Free Officers cell in the Egyptian army.32
Looking further back, by 1946, the MB had two main armed wings: the Special 
Apparatus (SA) and the Units Department (UD). The SA was mainly composed of 
civilians that received various levels of paramilitary training—Nasser and other Free 
Officers were among their instructors.33 In preparation for the coup, the SA had several 
roles, including securing the Cairo-Ismailia highway and blocking any advance of 
British troops from the Canal Zone if they decided to support the monarchy in Cairo. 
SA elements were also assigned to secure embassies in several districts of Cairo.34
The UD, meanwhile, was mainly responsible for propagating the ideology of the MB 
in the army and the police force as well as for recruiting officers. Some MB army 
officers referred to the group as Tanzim al-Dubbat al-Ikhwan (Organization of Brothers’ 
Officers).35 A secret list of the names, ranks, and divisions of these officers was handed 
over to Nasser by Major Mahmoud Labib, the founder of the UD, in 1949 so the Free 
Officers could recruit them to help with the coup.36 The last major military coordination 
between the MB and the Free Officers was on July 26, 1952 when Ra’uf led the siege 
of Ra’s al-Tin Royal Palace in Alexandria and exchanged fire with the Royal Guards. By 
the end of the day, Battalion 19, commanded by an MB officer, forced King Farouk I 
to abdicate.
Cooperation between the faction controlling the Free Officers and MB members did 
not last for long after the coup. Major sources of contention quickly came to the fore, 
including civilians’ place in the transition, constitutional crafting, political freedoms, 
land confiscation and redistribution, MB alliances with anti-Nasser army factions, 
and the army’s role in politics.37 By December 1952, Nasser made it clear to the MB 
that there would be neither free elections nor a re-installation of civilian leadership. In 
January 1953, the RCC dissolved and banned all political parties in Egypt. The MB 
did not oppose this decision because it did not affect them (they were not a political 
party) and also to avoid a costly clash with Nasser’s powerful faction in the RCC and the 
army, an opportunistic stance that would prove costly in the future. By January 1954, 
however, the RCC banned the MB itself. A crackdown followed during which around 
450 MB leaders and members were arrested.38
The confrontation between the leaders of the Free Officers and the MB intensified. On 
February 28, 1954, tens of thousands of protestors besieged General Naguib, then the 
president, and Colonel Nasser, then prime minister and minister of interior, in Abdin 
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Palace in downtown Cairo. The demands were clear: a return to civilian rule, the release 
of all political prisoners, the reinstatement of democratic institutions, and that the army 
return to its barracks.39 Nasser asked Abdul Qadir Audeh, the Secretary-General of the 
MB, to dismiss the protesters. Audeh complied, hoping to reach a compromise, but was 
arrested that same night by Nasser’s loyalists in the military police and was executed a year 
later.40 In 1993, leftist historian Abdel-Azim Ramadan, 
who is notably critical of the MB, wrote that Audeh 
was a “martyr of democracy who entered history” and 
that the show-trial that ordered his execution was “the 
worst disgrace in Egypt’s contemporary history.”41
On March 29, 1954, Nasser’s supporters organized a 
counter-demonstration, chanting slogans that included 
“down with democracy” and “down with educated 
people.”42 Another crackdown on the MB and other political groups followed. This 
time, given the level of repression, the MB did not have the capacity to stage a massive 
protest. In October 1954, however, a mid-ranking SA leader and one of his subordinates 
carried out an amateurishly organized, failed attempt on Nasser’s life.43 Nasser’s 
crackdown subsequently intensified with thousands of MB leaders and members being 
arrested and jailed, and those in the military being court-martialed.44 Six MB members 
were executed, and the General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi, was sentenced to death.45 
Ultimately, Nasser’s military faction won its 1952-1954 confrontation with the MB, 
crushing, though not quite destroying, the group.
The Second Round: 2011 – 2013
Karl Marx’s oft-quoted phrase, “history repeats itself, the first time as a tragedy, the 
second time as a farce” was about military coups ending political transitions. The 
“tragedy” that Marx was referring to was Napoléon Bonaparte’s 1799 coup that ended 
one of France’s revolutionary phases—a coup supported by large segments of the French 
population. The “farce” was the repetition of almost the same scenario at the hands of 
his nephew, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte. The latter staged a coup against a parliament in 
1851, also with the support of segments of the French population. 
Nineteenth century French revolutionaries and twenty-first century Egyptian Islamists 
do not have a lot in common, but Marx’s quote applies well to both. For Egypt, the 
similarities between the 1952-1954 and 2011-2013 periods are numerous. In 1952, 
the MB did not initiate the coup, but strongly supported and participated in it. The 
execution of the coup hinged on their support and approval.46 The same applies to the 
2011 uprising. The MB leadership did not plan or initiate it, but strongly supported it, 
contributing to the resilience of the Tahrir Square demonstrations in February 2011, 
and ultimately to Mubarak’s abdication.47
“Nasser’s military faction won its 1952-
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Between 2011 and 2013, the interactions between the MB and the military establishment 
can be divided into five phases. The first phase was March-December 2011, a period 
of cooperation between them. As opposed to Tunisia, where a civilian body led the 
post-dictatorship transition, almost all of the pro-uprising parties and groups accepted 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—an unconstitutional, politically 
conservative military body—as the leader of a “revolutionary” transition process.48 The 
SCAF devised a transitional roadmap in February and March 2011, and a seven-member, 
SCAF-appointed committee introduced 11 amendments to the 1971 constitution. One 
of the committee members was a renowned lawyer from the MB, Sobhy Saleh. The 
MB successfully campaigned for a “yes” vote for the amendments and 77.2 percent of 
voters complied on March 19, 2011.49 The final constitutional declaration of March 
30, 2011 was alarming, though—the SCAF not only 
suspended the amended 1971 constitution, but also 
added 51 other articles to a constitutional declaration 
that enhanced its powers. The MB and most of the 
“yes” voters did not oppose these changes.
Between March and December 2011, there were no 
strong reasons for an MB-SCAF conflict. Both sides 
emerged as winners. The MB wanted legitimacy via 
votes and institutions, and it had enough popular support to ensure it. The Democratic 
Alliance, a multi-ideological coalition led and dominated by the MB’s Freedom and 
Justice Party (FJP), won 235 seats in Egypt’s first free and fair parliamentary elections, 
only 20 seats short of an absolute majority. The SCAF did not mind because its March 
2011 constitutional declaration limited the mandate of elected institutions. Egypt’s first 
freely and fairly elected parliament, for example, could not appoint or sack a minister. 
The SCAF was also interested in having a final say in the transition process, especially 
top national security and political issues, and the MB played along.50
While the SCAF and the MB had no reason to clash during this phase, many parties and 
groups that struggled in the parliamentary elections and referendums were less content. 
These included entities as different as the pro-revolution “Revolution Continues” 
Coalition, and the anti-revolution, pro-Mubarak offshoots of the National Democratic 
Party (NDP). The strategy adopted by some of these losing parties was to  play “spoilers” 
by persistently trying to ally themselves with the military, calling for the prolonging of 
SCAF’s rule, as well as demanding the disbanding of elected institutions via various 
methods, including legal appeals and outright calls for a military coup.51 This strategy 
ultimately paid off, at least temporarily, for some of these parties and groups, such as 
the Social Democratic Party. It won only 16 seats (3.1 percent) in the parliamentary 
elections, but after the 2013 coup, the junta appointed two of the party’s founders 
and leading figures, Hazem al-Beblawi and Ziad Bahaa Al-Din, as prime minister and 
deputy prime minister. Both publicly defended a wave of repression and exclusion 
against their political rivals; Beblawi went as far as saying that “atrocities have to be 
“Almost all of the pro-uprising parties 
and groups accepted 
the SCAF as the leader 
of a “revolutionary” 
transition process.
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committed sometimes,” comparing the storming of the Rab‘a Square sit-in to World 
War II and Vietnam.52 
The level of cooperation between the MB and the SCAF started declining from January 
2012 with the convening of Egypt’s first freely elected parliament. This second phase 
of MB-SCAF relations lasted until June 2012. It was a phase of controlled conflict, 
summarized by the words of influential SCAF member General Mukhtar al-Mulla: 
“Whatever the majority in the People’s Assembly, they are very welcome, because they 
won’t have the ability to impose anything that the people don’t want.”53 The statement 
reflected the balance of power in the country. Despite more than 26 million Egyptians 
voting for the lower house of the parliament, the People’s Assembly, it was an institution 
with a weak mandate. Additionally, the performances of many of the Islamist members 
of parliament (MPs), mainly from the Nour Party bloc, were lamentable and made 
a mockery of Egypt’s first freely elected lower house. In June 2012, a SCAF decision 
dissolved the lower house following a constitutional court ruling that part of the electoral 
law was “unconstitutional.” This decision vested all legislative powers in the SCAF only 
days before Egypt’s first civilian president was scheduled to take office on June 30, 
2012. It was, in effect, a bloodless coup, one that passed without any international 
condemnation and limited domestic criticism. Because the winner in the parliamentary 
elections, the MB, had also won the presidency, it did not mobilize its supporters and 
coalition partners. The majority of the losers in the electoral process had been calling for 
the dissolution and cheered for it when it happened.
The third phase in the MB-SCAF relationship was an outright conflict between Morsi 
and the SCAF, which was headed by Field-Marshall Muhammad Hussein Tantawy. 
This confrontation played out between July and August 2012. On July 10, 2012, the 
constitutional court, with the public support of the SCAF, struck down a presidential 
attempt to reinstate the dissolved parliament. The SCAF aimed to keep its legislative 
powers, appoint a constitutional assembly, and ensure that the civilian presidency 
remained weak, but it was unexpectedly thwarted. 
A massacre of 16 soldiers by an armed group 
on August 5, 2012 in Sinai gave the President 
Morsi political space in which to undertake 
a daring purge of some of the most powerful 
generals.54 On August 12, Morsi issued decrees 
removing Tantawy, his deputy (General Sami 
Anan), and the heads of the General Intelligence 
Apparatus (Murad Mowafi), Presidential Guard 
(Muhammad Nagib Abdel-Salam), Military Police (Hamdy Badin), Cairo Security 
Directorate (Mohsen Murad), and Central Security Forces (Emad Al-Wakil) from their 
positions. The common features among those generals was their publicly known anti-
reform stance, defiance of elected civilian rule, and efforts to preserve as many of the 
policies, practices, and even figures of the Mubarak regime as possible.
“The third phase in the MB-SCAF relationship 
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While the dramatic dismissals increased Morsi’s support among some of the relatively 
weak and decentralized revolutionary youth groups, the stronger and more centralized 
actors in the armed and judicial institutions, as well as pro-Mubarak forces, were quite 
alarmed. “I thought: This man is not just a scarecrow, he is starting to show fangs … 
that made a lot of people uncomfortable,” said a former member of Mubarak’s NDP.55  
Between August and November 2012, however, the president started losing some 
of his non-Islamist, pro-revolution allies. This was due to disagreements on cabinet 
appointments (dominated by Mubarak-era holdovers), constitutional assembly tensions 
over articles (especially Salafi-supported ones), and the polarizing political narrative 
employed by the Islamist forces, as well as the deep mistrust between the MB/FJP and 
its former allies.56 Morsi’s next big move—the constitutional declaration of November 
2012—turned this tension into outright animosity. The constitutional declaration 
aimed to remove the Mubarak-era public prosecutor, protect the remaining elected and 
indirectly elected institutions—all of which had an Islamist majority—from dissolution 
by the Constitutional Court dominated by mostly Mubarak-era holdovers, bring about 
retrials of acquitted security generals, and compensate the victims of repression during 
and after the uprising. This declaration made rival politicians, senior bureaucrats, 
and armed institution leaders even more wary of Morsi’s potential power. “Regardless 
of his intentions, so far we only have a complete 
dictatorship. I will only believe judicial reform when 
I see it,” said a human rights and political activist who 
was campaigning against Morsi.57 While most pro-
revolution forces may have supported Morsi’s aims, 
for many, attempting to attain them through such a 
dramatic expansion of presidential power was a step 
too far. Given Egypt’s extreme polarization and the 
distrust between political forces, the level of resistance 
the declaration engendered was not surprising. A “zero-sum” attitude, which viewed any 
achievement by Morsi as a loss by his opponents, was the main feature of the political 
game. “It was imperative for the President to neutralize politicized Constitutional Court 
judges, whose rulings kept on striking down elected institutions. But the means used 
[were] not good,” said Dr. Muhammad Mahsoob, the former Minister of Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs.58
Somehow, the security institutions, both army and police, ultimately emerged from 
this crisis as winners. On the one hand, the army became a powerful “arbiter” between 
increasingly polarized political forces. Mohamed ElBaradei, for example, would refuse 
to meet with the elected president, but would instead ask to meet with the defense 
minister.59 Following the constitutional declaration, he said, “You cannot exclude that 
the army will intervene to restore law and order.”60 The other winner was the police force. 
Part of the police leadership and many officers decided to disengage from their duties 
and go on an undeclared strike. This began in February 2011 and gradually intensified 
“... The army became a powerful 
“arbiter” between 
increasingly polarized 
political forces.
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after the election of Morsi in June 2012.61 In December 2012, when demonstrators 
attacked the Ittihadiya presidential palace with Molotov cocktails and attempted to 
remove its gates with a crane, the Central Security Forces were nowhere to be found.62 
A similar stance was taken by some units from the Presidential Guards. When asked 
to send protection to the palace, Minister of Interior Ahmed Gamal al-Din asked the 
president to comply with the protesters’ demands before he would send any.63
On December 22, 2012, some of the police units stationed in front of the president’s 
residence almost joined the riot. “You son of … you will be in jail in a matter of hours 
… the likes of you cannot be in the presidential palace...” yelled a senior police officer 
in charge of securing the home of the president, where his wife and son were present.64 
“I strongly protested and informed the Presidential Guard of what was happening,” said 
Brigadier General Tarek Al-Gohary, a police officer who was among the units securing 
the house. When Al-Gohary protested, he was told by one of his colleagues that “he 
will be facing the fate of General al-Batran,” a Police General who was shot on January 
29, 2011—allegedly by two of his colleagues—after refusing to carry out the orders of 
General Habib al-Adly, Mubarak’s minister of interior, to open the gates of al-Qatta 
prison to release the convicts in an attempt to save the Mubarak regime by creating 
nation-wide chaos.65
In March 2013, the army made a mockery of Morsi in the Canal Zone. Facing bloody 
turmoil in Port Said, the minister of defense advised the president to declare a curfew, 
but instead of upholding it, the army held a soccer tournament in the Canal Zone cities 
during the curfew hours.66 Overall, especially from December 2012, the MB and the 
military were headed toward an open confrontation. The president faced a silent mutiny, 
initially from the police force, and then from the army.
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Coups have their own costs, benefits, and consequences. As previously established, they are high-risk, illegal endeavors. Coups are especially risky when they target recently elected institutions or figures due to those figures’ significant popular 
support and therefore a higher possibility of resistance. So why did the Sisi-led SCAF 
decide to stage the July 2013 coup? A few explanations exist, but before outlining them, 
it is useful to review the aims of the SCAF since it took power February 2011.
The January 2011 uprising was a product of the struggle of several socio-political 
forces that challenged the Mubarak status quo, but these pro-change forces had 
different motivations. The pro-revolution forces, whether Islamist or non-Islamist, 
were motivated by the regime’s corruption and repression. In contrast, the military 
establishment, led by the SCAF, believed that some of Mubarak’s policies, mainly those 
influenced by his son Gamal and his wife Susan, were undermining the interests of 
the establishment’s leaders. They nevertheless believed that the principal elements of 
the status quo should be maintained, especially the military establishment’s veto power 
over political decision-making. This difference in perceptions and objectives caused 
tensions and clashes throughout the SCAF’s rule, as well as Morsi’s. For example, to 
the SCAF, comprehensive security sector reform, bringing the armed forces under the 
control and oversight of democratically elected civilians, and budgetary transparency are 
at a minimum radical concepts and at a maximum threatening taboos that should be 
eliminated or rendered meaningless.67 
Between February 2011 and July 2013, the SCAF would have liked to combine a 
parliament with limited powers, a presidency that was subordinate to the military, 
and constitutional prerogatives that legitimized the military’s autonomy and potential 
control over high politics. The minimum the SCAF insisted on was a veto on foreign 
and security policy, independence for the army’s budget and economic complexes, 
legal immunity from prosecution on charges stemming from corruption or repression, 
and constitutional prerogatives to guarantee these arrangements. The veto power over 
political decision-making would include any issues that touch on national security or 
sensitive foreign policy, most importantly the relationship with Israel. To control high 
politics, the SCAF decreed a constitutional addendum in July 2012 that gave it the 
prerogatives of the dissolved parliament, including legislative authority, and the rights 
to form a constitutional assembly and veto constitutional articles.68 The addendum also 
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ordered the formation of a national defense council dominated by the military and 
granted military intelligence and military police the power to arrest civilians on charges 
as minor as traffic disruption and “insulting” the army.
The independent military-economic complexes, which benefit from preferential customs 
and exchange rates, tax exemption, land ownership and confiscation rights (without 
paying the treasury), and an army of almost-free laborers (conscripted soldiers) are 
the source of much military influence and thus another thorny issue for any elected 
civilian. With the Egyptian economy suffering, elected politicians might well seek to 
improve conditions by moving against the military’s civilian assets by imposing a form 
of taxation and revising the preferential rates and land confiscation policies. Corruption 
and immunity from prosecution are no less salient.
Despite its power, the SCAF was quite sensitive to certain factors. Pressure from the 
United States was one of them, due to its provision of arms, training, and funds. 
Street mobilization was another factor. Most of the SCAF’s pro-democracy decisions 
came as a result of massive pressure from Tahrir Square protests. These included the 
removal of Mubarak, his trial (and that of other regime figures), and bringing the date 
of the presidential election forward from June 2013 to June 2012. Another factor that 
influenced the SCAF’s decision-making was the army’s internal cohesion. It is no secret 
that internal reports about potential mutiny within the middle and lower ranks were 
among the factors that caused the SCAF to abandon Mubarak and disobey his orders to 
crack down on protesters.69 “The sight of officers in uniform protesting in Tahrir Square 
and speaking on Al Jazeera really worries the Field Marshal,” said a former officer.70
If those were the minimum objectives and the visible constraints, then what explains 
the decision to stage the July 2013 coup and the repressive follow-up? There are several 
explanatory models to consider in this regard.
Rational Actor Model 
Rational explanations for state and non-state political violence exist. Morality aside, the 
benefits of repression simply outweighed the costs of accommodation or inclusion in 
the calculations of the generals. If the generals perceived the elected bodies as potential 
future threats, and they could suspend a publicly approved constitution, dissolve an 
elected parliament, arrest an elected president, and kill, injure, or detain thousands who 
opposed these measures without accountability, why would they risk a future change in 
the balance of power?
Yet the military was by no means a loser in the 2011-2013 transition process. Not 
only did it enjoy multiple domains of power under President Morsi, but these domains 
were constitutionally legal. In the 2012 constitution, supported by the MB/FJP and 
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approved by 63.83 percent of voters, the defense minister had to be a military officer 
(article 195), and the National Defense Council would have a majority of military 
commanders (article 197). This effectively gave the military a veto over any national 
security or sensitive foreign policy issue. Article 198 allowed military tribunals for 
civilians “when a crime harms the armed forces.” Legal immunity from civilian courts 
was granted and there were no public indicators showing that civilian politicians were 
capable or willing to move against the military’s industrial complex, a black hole in the 
Egyptian economy. “[Morsi] did not really harm us….I mean the things [officers] care 
about like the salaries, the benefits, the pensions were all fine,” said a mid-ranking army 
officer three months before the July 2013 coup.71 Given the costs, benefits, and high 
probability of a bloody aftermath, the rational actor model alone does not explain the 
July coup, unless there was a miscalculation of the likely scale, scope, and intensity of 
popular anti-coup reactions.
Organizational Procedures and Factionalism
Another explanation for the military’s decisions and behavior lies in its organizational 
routines. Every institution has a set of “standard operating procedures” or SOPs: formal 
and informal rules according to which actions and reactions are determined.72 In the 
case of confronting anti-government protests, the 
use of intimidation and repression has been SOP 
for both the army and police forces over the last six 
decades of Egyptian politics.73
The January 2011 uprising posed a serious challenge 
to that model by directly challenging the power of 
coercive institutions such as the Central Security 
Forces or the Military Police, while also demanding greater accountability from security 
services of all stripes. It is clear that the military felt uncomfortable with this new state 
of affairs. “What police officers have been faced with in the last two years has created a 
new environment... In that new environment, the police officer would stand up to you 
up to a certain point. [But he] won’t be prepared to use tear gas, grenades or shotguns. 
If someone dies, if something happens to somebody, [the officer] might get tried… [The 
officer] is not going to do it. And I want to tell you all–the protestors have realized this,” 
General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi was compelled to explain to several officers in a widely 
disseminated video.74 He stressed that the police would be of less help to the military in 
the event of a crackdown given fears of being held liable for any abuse or killings. 
Despite these concerns, continuity rather than change seemed the order of the day. This 
was certainly true for Egypt’s security services. One police officer, speaking in the wake 
of an October 2013 crackdown that killed 50 protestors, said, “Look, this is how we 
used to work for two decades. We played by the book in October … it is a bad book but 
“...The use of intimidation and 
repression has been 
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there is no chance of replacing it now.”75 Even before Muhammad Morsi took office, 
the military was only too willing to play by the same book. Military forces condoned 
or participated in harsh responses to demonstrations and sit-ins throughout 2011, most 
notably against Coptic Christian demonstrators 
in front of the Maspero government television 
building in October 2011. 
A third potential explanation for how the 
military makes decisions has to do with 
factionalism within the security establishment 
and its political allies. Coup perpetrators 
and supporters often divide into two coalitions after the coup, one that advocates the 
eradication of the ousted party while the other calls for limited inclusion and controlled 
repression. The erradicadors versus diálogistas (eradicators versus dialogists) saga is 
common in the history of South American juntas. O’Donnell and Schmitter refer to 
them as “duros” (hard-liners) and “blandos” (soft-liners). In addition to their stance 
on eradication and limited inclusion, the first group believes “that the perpetuation of 
authoritarian rule is possible and desirable, if not by rejecting outright all democratic 
forms, then by erecting some façade behind which they can maintain the hierarchical 
and authoritarian nature of their power.” The second group agrees with the first on using 
repression in the initial phases, but believes it is necessary to reintroduce certain freedoms 
and some degree of electoral legitimation to maintain the system.76 Such divides have 
played out elsewhere away from South America, including in Greece in 1967, Algeria in 
1992, and, as described above, in Egypt following its 1952 coup.77
By August 2013, major parts of the pro-coup factional map were clear for analysts and 
observers. Speaking about General Mohammad Farid al-Tohamy, the head of the General 
Intelligence Apparatus, one Western diplomat told the New York Times, “He was the 
most hardline, the most absolutely unreformed.”78 Tohamy was a strong advocate of 
the August 2013 crackdown on Rab‘a Square that yielded more than 1,250 fatalities.79 
Within that faction, there is a strong belief that Field Marshal Tantawy was lenient in 
dealing with protestors. Therefore, the lesson learned from Mubarak and Tantawy’s days 
was to crack down harder. The SCAF understood that if it used Qaddafi- or Assad-like 
tactics following the coup, the likelihood of a NATO intervention to save the revolution 
(as in Libya) or any significant armed resistance (as in Syria) would be almost nil. If parts 
of the latter scenario did materialize, however, the army and the police would have a 
superior capacity to utilize violence and win any armed conflict, as it did in Upper Egypt 
in the 1990s. It would also have the legitimacy to do so, due to the armed dimension 
of the conflict.    
In August 2013, European Union envoy Bernardino León and Deputy U.S. Secretary of 
State William Burns led a mediation process aimed at containing and potentially resolving 
the post-coup crisis.80 “They told us that there are moderates in the government…
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they meant Dr. Mohammad ElBaradei,” said Dr. Amr Darrag, the former Minister 
of Planning and International Cooperation and an FJP politician.81 The core of the 
plan was to release the heads of two political parties, FJP leader and former parliament 
speaker Saad al-Ketatny and al-Wasat Party leader Abu al-Ila Mady, to negotiate a 
resolution with international guarantees in exchange for calling off the sit-ins in Rab‘a 
and al-Nahda Squares. On August 6, León phoned Darrag to tell him that the crisis was 
about to be resolved peacefully, but over the following week, the dialogist side, a weak 
minority within the military-appointed government, was successfully marginalized.82 
On August 14, hours after the Rab‘a crackdown, León said, “We had a political plan 
that was on the table, that had been accepted by the [MB]…. [The SCAF] could have 
taken this option. So all that has happened today was unnecessary.”83 ElBaradei, the 
Nobel laureate who plotted the coup with the junta and served as a vice president in 
the post-coup government, but was marginalized after calling for limiting the repression 
after a third major crackdown against anti-coup 
activists on July 27, 2013, resigned the same day as 
the Rab‘a massacre.84
It is important to note that the eradicator and 
dialogist categories by no means correspond to 
a military-civilian divide. In almost all of the 
aforementioned cases, including in Egypt, civilian figures have strongly supported and 
lobbied for “eradication” policies, including journalists, politicians, clerics and other 
religious figures, businessmen, youth activists, and even “human rights” activists.85 One 
former human rights activist and academic called for turning mosques and schools into 
concentration camps for 750,000 alleged members of the ousted party.86
In a conversation with a pro-dialogue brigadier general who focuses on negotiations 
within the Egyptian armed forces, the author asked if he or other specialists within the 
military were consulted on how to resolve the crisis without further bloodshed. “Our 
[pro-dialogue] opinions were not welcomed at that moment,” he replied.87  
The Psychological Factor 
There is also a psychological explanation for the military’s decision to perpetuate a coup 
and the subsequent repression of its opponents. This aspect of the military’s decision-
making is perhaps the least studied and is certainly harder to research. Since the 1952 
coup, a superiority complex has steadily developed within the military. General Gamal 
Hammad, a member of the Free Officers and author of the first communiqué of the 
1952 coup, mentioned that newly ruling officers had become “crazy with power” once 
they gradually realized that their “words have become laws … and that they became the 
new masters of Egypt.”88 
“Since the 1952 coup, a superiority complex has 
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Sixty years later, having a civilian declare himself as the “supreme commander of the 
armed forces” was unacceptable for many military commanders, not only because 
“civilian” is believed to be an inferior category, but also because an ikhwan (Muslim 
Brother) is believed to have low status within that inferior category, and is usually 
associated with lower-middle class, rural migrants. “Every time [Morsi] says ‘I am the 
supreme commander of the armed forces,’ I want to hit him with something,” said an 
army officer in April 2013, three months before the coup.89 
The effect of this superiority complex on behavior and decision-making was reinforced 
by interactions between the SCAF and various civilian politicians and activists during 
the transition period. “The SCAF would weigh them, analyze them, dissect them, 
understand what they want, what they crave...the [SCAF] member in charge of this was 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the head of the military intelligence,” said a retired army Major 
General.90 “They [civilian politicians] certainly did not earn their [SCAF] respect. By 
March 2011, the question became: how can we [military] handover the country to these 
people (civilian politicians)?... Ideas such as a ‘safe exit’ for the SCAF were laughable. We 
[military] should give them a safe exit if we were generous, not the other way around…. 
that was the thinking,” said the general.   
Far from “handing over the country,” the issue of civilian oversight, even within a 
weak institutional arrangement, was psychologically problematic. This was reflected in 
General Sisi’s comments while meeting with military officers: “We haven’t seen the end 
of this yet .… there is a coming parliament, it may ask questions, and I wonder what 
will we do about that … we have to prepare to 
confront this without negatively affecting us.”91 
This pre-coup, forthcoming parliament would 
have probably had a significant percentage, if 
not a majority, of Islamist MPs. 
The military’s superiority complex is not limited 
to civilian politicians and civilian institutions. It 
is also directed at other armed institutions, such 
as the police force. Despite a dominant military dimension in the police force hierarchy, 
rankings, laws, organizational structures, training and curricula, the force is described in 
its bylaws and constitutions as a “civilian entity;” hence—in terms of prestige—it is seen 
as inferior to the military, especially after the January uprising. “Military officers believe 
that they saved the Ministry of Interior from protesters,  and protected police stations 
and prisons…and without them the Ministry [of Interior] would have collapsed,” said a 
police officer attempting to the explain the military’s superiority complex over the police 
force following the January 2011 uprising.92  
Finally, the aforementioned decision-making frames are not mutually exclusive and can 
sometimes be applied in combination. Overall, within a domestic framework, they help 
“The issue of civilian oversight, even within a weak 
institutional arrangement, 
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explain why the military leadership decided to pursue the risky course of carrying out a 
coup followed by a violent crackdown in its aftermath. 
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The main question raised in this section is how the MB made decisions when faced with the sensitive crises of the transitional 2011-2013 period. Some of these critical decisions include supporting the uprising in January 2011, fielding 
a presidential candidate in April 2012, and resisting the coup in July 2013. 
It should be mentioned here that based on its historical behavior, the MB is a highly 
pragmatic organization.93 It is more reformist than revolutionary in its political objectives 
and more gradualist than radical in its political behavior. The organization has always 
lagged behind its state-affiliated political rivals in terms of capacity and resources. This 
includes not only the military establishment, but also the parties that became parts of 
the state machinery, such as Mubarak’s NDP and Nasser’s Socialist Union. In other 
words, the MB has been a threat to Egypt’s authoritarian institutions, but through its 86 
years of history, it has never been strong enough to defeat them.
A Rational Actor? 
Given the above, one can assume a rational actor model of decision-making. The MB 
would have wanted to maximize its gains by making use of the opportunities presented 
by the transition process. The leadership, represented by the MB’s Guidance Office, 
knew that it could win elections and survive within institutions. At the same time, 
the organization was quite wary of the military and its intentions. The MB lost every 
confrontation it had with Egypt’s military regimes in the 1950s and 1960s. Rationally, 
the MB needed to enhance its influence in less prominent, and thereby less risky, spheres 
and avoid direct clashes with a stronger actor.
Between February 2011 and August 2012, the MB generally behaved in the 
aforementioned fashion. It attempted to maximize its gains within relatively safe spheres 
and avoided overly provocative actions. The organization participated in elections, joined 
institutional frameworks, and mostly avoided unnecessary protests and escalatory rhetoric 
regarding the ruling junta. There were some exceptions, however. In November 2011, 
the MB, along with other political and revolutionary forces, rallied their supporters in 
Tahrir Square in reaction to the SCAF’s “supra-constitutional” document that effectively 
made the military establishment an independent authority. The document was proposed 
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by Ali al-Selmi of the al-Wafd Party, who was, ironically, the deputy prime minister for 
“democratic transition,” as appointed by the SCAF.
Another controlled clash came in June 2012, prior to the announcement of the 
presidential elections results. As a retired major general who was following the MB-
SCAF talks at that time explained, “The SCAF wanted the MB to acknowledge what 
was in al-Selmi’s document, or else Morsi’s victory will be declared null due to rigging.... 
Some of the MB leaders did not accept. But in the end they opted for a compromise.”94 
During these hard talks, the response of the FJP/MB and other pro-Morsi groups was to 
stage a sit-in in Tahrir Square between June 17 and 24.
Regardless of what happened during the June talks, Morsi was elected by the end of 
that month, and the SCAF did not annul any results via the judiciary. Moreover, in 
December 2012, the SCAF got some significant privileges in the new constitution 
supported by the MB/FJP. The MB’s strategic choice appears to have been to gradually 
advance, avoid clashes with the SCAF, and possibly make some changes in moments 
they deemed “correct.” One such moment was in August 2012, when Morsi was not 
only able to freeze the constitutional addendum enacted by the SCAF in June 2012, but 
also to carry out the aforementioned purge of top generals. Morsi was only able to do 
this because of the acquiescence of other army generals and some active public support 
for these measures.95
There were, however, challenges to such a gradualist, risk-averse strategy. It was very clear 
that major factions and bureaucracies within the military and security establishments 
were not interested in complying with the new political order. Morsi’s friendly rhetoric 
(he would refer to army officers as “men of gold” and the police forces as “at the heart 
of the January revolution”), the doubling of police and army officers’ pay, benefits, and 
pensions, and the prerogatives the constitution granted to the military failed to endear the 
elected civilian to the military-security establishments. This was becoming quite visible 
during and after the events of December 2012 (see above). By then, major factions and 
bureaucracies, including figures within the Ministry of Interior, the Presidential Guards, 
and the Second Field Army were acting independently of any presidential influence.
At that point, the MB’s rational options were limited to two tracks. The first track was 
to try to limit the damage via various forms of tactical retreats, ranging from acquiescing 
to the demands of the opposition and agreeing to change the government to having 
Morsi resign and calling for early presidential elections.96 The second track was one 
of tactical defense: to seek out powerful allies within the armed institutions, possibly 
starting with loyalists in the Presidential Guards Corps or other units. The first track 
was, partly, the choice of President de Gaulle in France’s May 1968 crisis, as well as of 
Prime Minister Erdogan in Turkey’s April 2007 crisis. The second track was the choice 
of President Sadat in Egypt’s May 1971 crisis.97 In these cases, presidents were able to 
tactically outmaneuver the military leadership and come out victorious, partly due to 
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the support of loyalists within the military.98 A riskier track would have been to attempt 
to establish a parallel armed institution from army and police generals and officers and 
other recruits, a tactic that failed Salvador Allende in Chile and Thaksin Shinawatra in 
Thailand, but was more successful for Leon Trotsky in Russia, Ayatollah Khomeini in 
Iran, and Tancredo Neves in Brazil. 
Organizational Procedures and Factionalism 
The organizational procedures and factionalism models can hardly be separated in the 
MB case for several reasons, including the underdeveloped decision-making structures 
within the organization. All 16 MB figures interviewed for this section agree on two 
issues.99 First, the MB has no national SOPs that are carried out in times of crisis. Second, 
the organization has some ad-hoc arrangements that are produced by the administrative 
offices—the highest regional executive bodies in each of Egypt’s 27 governorates—based 
on reports coming from observers on the ground.
There are, however, two national, internal bodies that are quite important to focus 
on: the Maktab al-Irshad (Guidance Office) and the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative 
Council). The Guidance Office has acted as the highest national executive body in the 
organization since its establishment in July 1931. In 2012, it had 18 elected and 1 
appointed members. The Consultative Council acts as a representative assembly of the 
organization. It had 123 members in 2012. According 
to the internal regulations of the MB, both bodies are 
involved in major political decision-making.
In general, from the early 1980s onwards, the political 
behavior of both entities can be categorized as “prag-
matic gradualism.” Both often lean toward comprises 
and are relatively risk-averse in most of their decisions. Three major exceptions exist, 
however: the decision to fully support the January 2011 uprising, the decision to field a 
presidential candidate in 2012, and the decision to resist the July 2013 coup. To explain 
these three decisions, factionalism needs to be investigated.
The Egyptian MB is a very complex organization whose estimated number of “working” 
and “regular” members may reach 750,000.100 This is in addition to hundreds of 
thousands in the lower “supporter” and “affiliate” membership categories and the group’s 
large pool of sympathizers. MB leaders, including several members of the Guidance 
Office, asserted that the MB has no official statistics of its membership and is unwilling 
to compile any.101 As a result of the large numbers, the internal factional map of the 
organization is complex. While reviewing all of the MB’s major factions is outside 
the scope of this analysis, the impact of the group’s influential “revolutionary youth” 
component and “Iron Organization” on its aforementioned decisions is discussed below.
“The MB has no national SOPs that are 
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Revolutionary Youth
In January 2011, a decentralized, urban faction that the media dubbed Shabab al-
Ikhwan (MB youth) was quite active in organizing the protests of January 25.102 The 
older leadership of the organization was quite hesitant and worried about a crackdown 
if the protests failed. Islam Lotfy was a leading member of the youth faction and an MB 
representative in the multi-ideological Youth of the Revolution Coalition before the 
MB leadership expelled him. He said, “We asked the leadership to support the sit-in 
by food, blankets, and sound-systems, but the support was late. So we had to go to the 
Guidance Office at 22:30 to convince them of [providing] full support. It was hard.”103 
Multiple leading MB figures joined the scattered protests on January 25, but many 
of them thought it would be another normal day and left in the early evening. It was 
mainly the youth faction that insisted on a prolonged sit-in and dragged the leadership 
into the 18-day confrontation. The same scenario was repeated on February 2, 2011, 
when Mubarak loyalists attacked the Tahrir sit-in. Most leaders of various pro-uprising 
political forces asked their youth to retreat due to the imbalance of (hard) power. The 
MB leadership was no exception, but many of the youth ignored the orders.
The resistance to the July coup followed a similar pattern. When the author asked two 
members of the Guidance Office how they arrived at the decision of pursuing civil 
resistance against the coup despite the balance of power (and terror) being heavily tilted 
toward the military, their answer was complex. They cited distrust and the lack of a 
credible commitment to or guarantor for any solution as primary reasons, but they also 
spoke of having to take into consideration the organization’s youth, who were not only 
in a revolutionary, confrontational mode, but had lost many friends and colleagues 
during the crackdowns. 
“Iron Organization”
Another important MB faction is the one sometimes referred to as the “Iron Organization.” 
It is a well-disciplined group headed by the General Guide’s second deputy, Khairat 
al-Shater. The Iron Organization is inward looking and generally focused on internal 
capacity-building and empowerment. It is also known for its uncompromising loyalty 
to al-Shater. The term “iron” does not refer to political violence or arms, but rather to 
the centralization of its authority structure. This faction was quite influential, if not 
dominant, in various critical decisions, including the decision to field its leader as a 
presidential candidate in March 2012.
Factional competition within the MB was intense at that point in time. The MB expelled 
Abdel-Moneim Abu al-Fotouh in April 2011 for defying a Consultative Council decision 
by declaring his presidential candidacy the prior month. Abu al-Fotouh belonged to 
rival faction whose main distinction is its preference for less centralization. Rhetorically, 
at least, Abu al-Fotouh’s faction also leans more toward cross-ideological cooperation 
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with political “others.” The struggle for influence and leadership within the MB was 
tilting towards al-Shater’s side, which, combined with other reasons, prompted Abu 
al-Fotouh to take the daring step of running for president in an effort to extend his 
influence outside of the organization. Al-Shater later announced his own candidacy, 
following that of Abu al-Fotouh.
By mid-March 2012, the MB leadership had reached two conclusions. The first was 
that the parliament had very limited influence on the SCAF or the government it had 
appointed. The MB’s leadership also understood that the dissolution of the parliament 
was only a matter of time. The parliament’s speaker, Dr. Saad Al-Katatni, publicly 
announced on April 25 that SCAF-appointed Prime Minister Kamal Al-Ganzouri had 
told him “the ruling to dissolve the Parliament is in the drawer of the Constitutional 
Court.”104 The second conclusion was that all non-MB presidential candidates the MB 
wanted to support had declined to run in the elections. This happened after months of 
discussion and negotiations, including with senior 
judiciary figures such as Tarek Al-Bishri, former 
first deputy of the Council of State, and Hossam 
al-Gheriani, former head of the Cassation Court 
and Supreme Council of Judiciary.105
These conclusions contributed to the MB’s decision 
to pursue the presidency. “We fielded a candidate 
at this point out of necessity, not in attempt to 
challenge the SCAF,” said Ibrahim Mounir, the MB’s representative in the United 
Kingdom.106 But the MB’s decision was also the result of the organization’s factional 
map. The MB’s Consultative Council voted at least two times on the decision of whether 
to field a presidential candidate.107 At the first vote in mid-March 2012 the proposal was 
rejected, 52 to 13.108 The second vote took place on April 3, 2012, following a meeting 
between Morsi and the heads of the SCAF. This time, the council narrowly approved 
fielding a candidate, 56 to 52. The revote, reversed decision, and candidacy of al-Shater 
can be explained mainly by the factional balance of power within the organization and 
the presidential candidacy of Abu al-Fotouh.109 It remains, however, that 48 percent of 
the Consultative Council opposed running a candidate in the presidential elections, 
regardless of which candidate was going to run.
The Psychological Dimension
A thorough understanding of the MB’s policy choices cannot dismiss the psychological 
impact of the organization’s repression on its decision-making.110 The memories of brutal 
repression under Nasser (1954-1970) were well-integrated into the MB’s literature and 
indoctrination process. The majority of the top-tier of the group’s leadership suffered 
under it. Moreover, the crackdowns and military tribunals of Mubarak (1981-2011) 
were too fresh to be ignored when the uprising started on January 25, 2011. That partly 
explains the official leadership’s hesitation to fully support the uprising in the beginning. 
“All non-MB presidential candidates 
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It also explains the rush to the negotiating table (along with other political and youth 
forces and figures) when Mubarak’s head of General Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, called 
for it. “If that uprising had failed, we would have been the first to be hanged.… It won’t 
be just the youth who called for it,” said a member of the Guidance Office.111
The MB leadership is captive to its history of repression. This was reflected in how 
it sought rushed, and sometimes irrational, compromises in exchange for guaranteed 
legitimacy that would potentially fend off future repression. The cautiousness in any 
revolutionary decisions, such as the full mobilization in the Muhammad Mahmoud 
events of November 2011 and the lack of any serious reaction to the dissolution of Egypt’s 
first elected parliament, can be partly attributed to that dimension.112 The decision to 
resist the military coup of July 2013 came as an anomaly. On a rational level, the balance 
of (hard) power was clearly not on the side of the elected president, but instead heavily 
tilted towards the armed institutions that ousted him. On a psychological level, civil 
resistance in the form of protests, marches, sit-ins, and strikes meant a likely repetition 
of the past horror of waves of brutal repression by an armed, mobilized opponent.
Indeed, the MB had faced a similar episode in 
February 1954, which came to be known as “Abdel 
Qadr Audeh’s decision.” Many leaders and mid-
ranking members believe that his decision to dismiss 
protesters without a guaranteed compromise with 
Nasser’s military faction was a major mistake that led to the collapse of the last preventive 
wall against Nasser’s repression. On July 17, 2013, Audeh’s son Khaled, a university 
professor, reminded the hundreds of thousands of protesters in Rab‘a Square of that 
mistake. “Our stance here is our way to success. I swear I will never dismiss you like my 
father, the martyr Abdel-Qadr Audeh, dismissed the protesters on 28 February 1954.… 
They tricked him and told him to dismiss the protestors and that the army would go 
back to its barracks and democracy would be resumed. He believed them. And then he 
was arrested at night and executed afterwards.”113 
The psychological burden of 1954 and its aftermath blurred important factors in the 
2013 comparisons. Perhaps the most important factor was that the 1954 army was not 
united behind Nasser. Army officers, mainly concentrated in the artillery and armored 
corps, did not approve of Nasser’s style of military rule. Moreover, important military 
figures in the Free Officers movement and others wanted to recall the parliament and 
resume constitutional democratic politics, including General Naguib (from February 
1954 onwards), Colonels Ahmad Shawky, Yusuf Siddiq, Rashad Mehanna, and Major 
Khaled Mohyiddin. This was in addition to many junior officers (captains and first 
lieutenants) who never received enough merit for attempting to undermine a military 
dictatorship in the making and to reinstate a parliamentary democracy. These types of 
pro-democracy officers were either not present or did not act in July 2013. 
“The MB leadership is captive to its history 
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Lastly, a senior Egyptian official who supported the January 2011 uprising suggested 
that there was an irrational, metaphysical element to the MB’s decision-making. He 
said: “…Don’t think about the French or the American [revolutions]… those [MB 
officials] are not revolutionaries. They believe that if they have patience, the stick will 
be broken on their back, rather than their back getting broken. Then God is going to 
intervene last minute to save them as a reward for their patience.”114
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Civil-military relations in general, and Islamist-military relations in particular, are key determinants of Egypt’s political future. They will directly impact national reconciliation, the functioning of state institutions, civil society, citizen security, 
and human rights. Egypt’s prospects for social stability, and thereby economic recovery, 
will remain bleak if the relationship between the highly organized, once widely popular 
MB and the politicized military is not redefined and brought under the control of 
institutional, democratic rules of political competition. Several other conclusions and a 
few recommendations can be deduced from the above analysis of the parties’ decision-
making. They target two issue-areas: civil-military relations in Egypt and conflict resolution 
mechanisms for the worst crisis in Egypt’s contemporary history.
In terms of rational calculations, Egypt’s military as a whole would likely benefit in the long-
term from a balanced civil-military relationship within a democratic framework, regardless 
of the specific political party or coalition that would initially and temporarily come to 
power. A study of interstate wars between 1816 and 1982 found that democracies are more 
likely to win wars, whether they are the targets or the aggressors.115 This finding is part of a 
wider literature on why the armed forces of democratic countries are likely to be superior 
in combat. The reasons for that superiority include accountability, transparency, political 
considerations of elected leaders, more prudent choices of when to fight, better resource 
marshaling, and greater public support.116 Additionally, the appointment, promotion, and 
payment of junior officers, which make up the majority of the officer corps, are part of 
a much more transparent, and therefore less corrupt and fairer, system. Choosing not 
to democratize and instead maintaining a military-controlled authoritarian rule will 
have negative consequences for the military, almost inevitably dragging it into further 
confrontations with one or more segments of the Egyptian society. Such confrontations 
can be persistent and even pose a credible threat to social peace, security, and political 
stability in the country.
Security studies in general and civil-military relations in particular are not widely taught in 
Egypt’s higher education institutions, whether civilian or military. To enhance democratic 
civil-military relations, Narcis Serra, the former long-serving civilian defense minister 
of Spain (1982-1991) and one of the main architects of its military reform process, 
recommends “an energetic policy of dialogue with the legislature to encourage the training 
of members of parliament from all political formations, the promotion of security studies 
in universities and the opening of centers of advanced military studies to civilians.”117
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Externally, two major democratic powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, 
are involved in the educational training of Egyptian military officers. The United States 
is involved through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) programs. FMF supports purchases of U.S. arms, 
defense equipment and services, and military and technical training. The IMET program 
is, generally, an exchange program for foreign military officers to study and train in 
the United States and at U.S.-affiliated regional centers. Civil-military relations courses 
should be introduced in the curricula of the IMET program, and added to the many 
training courses provided to Egyptian officers and students by the United Kingdom’s 
Royal College of Defense Studies, Joint Services Command and Staff College, and other 
institutions.
The two U.S. programs have been the most consistent and largest sources of financial 
assistance to Egypt’s military. After an initial military loan of $1.5 billion in 1979 and 
a reduction in 1981 to $550 million, annual U.S. military assistance to Egypt leveled 
off in 1987 and remained constant at $1.3 billion in FMF grants. Funding for IMET 
has fluctuated between $200,000 and $2 million annually, averaging roughly $1.3 
million a year.118 This type of assistance should not have been partly resumed until 
the conditions and certification requirements in the U.S. government’s appropriations 
bill for the 2014 fiscal year had been met.119 Egypt’s military regime has certainly not 
met the congressional condition of taking “steps to 
support a democratic transition” needed to release 
suspended military assistance. In the context of 
unprecedented human rights violations—including 
tens of thousands imprisoned, mass trials, reports 
of widespread torture and sexual abuse in detention, 
and the wholesale exclusion of dissenters from 
politics—the Egyptian authorities’ adherence to 
superficial electoral procedures is meaningless.120 
On April 29, 2014, Senator Patrick Leahy summarized this problem succinctly: “I 
am extremely disturbed by the Egyptian government’s flouting of human rights and 
appalling abuse of the justice system, which are fundamental to any democracy. I am 
not prepared to sign off on the delivery of additional aid for the Egyptian military until 
we have a better understanding of how the aid would be used, and we see convincing 
evidence that the government is committed to the rule of law.”121 Moreover, without 
Egyptian parliamentary oversight of the aid, it actually strengthens the independence 
of a repressive, politicized, autocratic military institution—an unintended consequence 
that ultimately undermines the prospects for democratization and balanced civil-
military relations.
The military’s superiority complex and its perception of civilians, and particularly civilian 
politicians, as inferior, will need to be thoroughly addressed, ideally from the first year in 
the Egyptian War College and Police Academy. Changing these attitudes will be a long-
“A rational reevaluation of the 
decisions taken during 
2011-2013 and their 
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term process, one that will confront an institutional culture and psychological complex 
built and nurtured in the military and security establishments over seven decades. The 
principle of equality can be legitimized by stressing the concept of citizenship in these 
institutions, as well as a basic understanding of human rights and their importance. 
Such concepts should also be introduced in the curricula of primary and secondary 
schools. But overall, the shift in this dimension has to be sponsored from above, whether 
by a reformist leadership or a strong reformist faction in the leadership. This type of 
leadership is also critical for altering repression-intensive SOPs and the official and 
unofficial policies that generally violate basic human rights.
On the MB side, a rational reevaluation of the decisions taken during 2011-2013 
and their consequences is critical for the organization, even during the current heavy 
crackdown. The ousting of narrowly elected leaders by a military junta seeking to 
preserve its privileges is a centuries-old saga, repeated in different versions on five 
continents. The strategies and tactics for altering or minimizing such actions’ impact 
on democratization are also quite old. Perhaps one of the most important lessons from 
South American and South European experiences is the effectiveness of a sustained, solid, 
and cross-ideological civilian front that constantly 
pressures the junta for democratization and the de-
politicization of the military. The likelihood of a 
successful democratic transition in Egypt will hinge 
on the availability, sustainability, and tenacity of 
such a front. Whereas there is some basis for such a 
movement, the Egyptian opposition is still far from 
establishing it. Additionally, former MB leaders have 
suggested that the organization cannot compete in 
elections except in a consolidated democracy where the institutional rules of the game 
are well established and respected by all sides.122 If that is the case, then the MB should 
rethink its role in any transition period, and relegate itself to being a secondary political 
player. That would entail, at a minimum, foregoing the pursuit of leading executive 
positions during such periods.
Historically, factionalism and internal rivalries within the MB have been the main 
determinants of organizational behavior and decision-making, especially during times 
of crises such as in 1954, 1964, and 2011. As with the military, the MB’s internal 
factional map is a good indicator of where the organization is heading. Rival factions 
can undermine rational calculations and lead the organization into disastrous courses 
of action. Psychologically, crackdowns by the military and security services, along with 
the support of the MB’s civilian political rivals for such repression, have produced a 
victims’ complex and a conspiratorial outlook among the leadership. This constantly 
undermines the organization’s ability to pursue transparent decision-making and contain 
or neutralize the polarization of its rivals.
“Crackdowns have produced a victims’ 
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The levels of popular support for the military and the MB are much greater than 
that for any of the other political forces in the country, including the decentralized, 
under-resourced youth groups that initially called for the January 2011 uprising. At 
first glance, this may be problematic for the future of democratization in the country. 
But the humanitarian, political, and economic costs of the 2013 military coup are 
high and the costs of the post-coup eradication policies are even higher, and will likely 
increase in the coming months. As other historical cases suggest, all sides are likely to 
reconsider their positions. Sparked by the costs of repression and the aggressiveness of 
the status quo, a process of “forced maturation” may ensue. Egypt is less likely to make 
political or economic progress without a reconciliation process and an institutional, 
conflict-resolution arrangement between its two major political actors, the military and 
the Islamists. Egypt’s current and future political crises will not be adequately resolved 
without a thorough reconfiguration of its Islamist-military relations.
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